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Abstract
We study e⁄ects of trust in implicit contracts. Trust changes whenever the principal honors
or dishonors an implicit contract. Usually a higher discount rate lowers the value of trade
in an agency. We show that a su¢ ciently high level of (ex ante) trust can o⁄set this ef-
fect. Strategies of principals representing unique equilibria are endogenously derived given
di⁄erent levels of agents￿bounded rationality. These strategies mirror a subset of the class
of trigger strategies which is exogenously entered into previous implicit contracting models.
Therefore our results o⁄er some justi￿cation for using that conventional approach. Implica-
tions for performance evaluation are discussed.
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Over the past decade, the issue of trust in business transactions has gained increasing attention
by researchers.1 It is widely undisputed that trust a⁄ects many transactions and increases their
value added.2 Relational contracts often rely on trust. This is especially true in a knowledge
based economy (Adler, 2001). Here, services delivered to or received from trade partners often
require "innovation and knowledge inputs" which render complete contracts prohibitive if not
infeasible, and trust - in receiving high quality inputs - then performs much better as a "contract"
device than explicit and veri￿able contract terms. Besides this interorganizational trust, intra-
organizational or interpersonal trust is important, too. Firms, when contracting with their
employees, often ￿nd it convenient to describe the job requirements in vague terms or they expect
employees to provide additional input beyond contracted levels if that is necessary. Employees,
in turn, expect ￿rms to reward them for their ￿ exibility and additional performance. As such
both parties, employer and employee, expect the other party to behave cooperatively in the
absence of binding agreements.
The problem to verify performance (and sign binding contracts) often shows up in incentive
contracting with employees. The assumption of veri￿able performance used to be standard but
as Prendergast (1999, p. 57) notes, "most people don￿ t work in jobs like these". Subjective - non-
veri￿able - performance evaluation then represents the method of choice. To make subjective
performance evaluation schemes and processes work it is essential that those who are being
evaluated and receive compensation contingent on evaluation trust the process (Baker, 1990, p.
55).
Analytical research on subjective performance evaluation has focused on self-enforcing contracts.
Employers were assumed to comply with the implicit part of the contract, i.e. the bonus pay-
ment based on subjective performance evaluation, as long as it is bene￿cial with regard to
future payo⁄s (e.g., Baker et al., 1994; Bull, 1987 ; Levin, 2003; MacLeod/Malcomson, 1988;
Pearce/Stacchetti, 1998). When non-compliance was observed once, the agency could generate
only the worst possible surplus in all future periods. This grim trigger strategy was therefore
exogenous to the models. Also, trust could not play a role as contracting parties were completely
rational and therefore able to foresee contract ful￿llment. In this paper, we extend the afore-
mentioned models and include trust as an integral part of the agency. This requires a departure
from the full rationality assumption.
In the standard model of implicit contracting where rational players mutually anticipate their
equilibrium strategies trust is either perfect or there is no trust at all. In a dynamic relationship,
1Various journals published special issues on "trust", e.g. Academy of Management Review (1998), Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization (2004), or Organization Science (2003).
2See, for example, the review of empirical ￿ndings in Dirks/Ferrin (2001).
2however, trust should evolve depending on past decisions.3 We develop a model where the agent
uses the number of previous contract ful￿llments to update beliefs on the probability that the
contract will be ful￿lled in the next period. To establish a model where an evolution of trust is
consistent with equilibrium behavior, we use a bounded rationality approach. We assume that
there are many di⁄erent types of principals in the market: non-strategic types who always ful￿ll
the implicit contract and strategic types who only ful￿ll a contract if it is optimal with regard to
future payo⁄s. Furthermore, principals have di⁄erent lifetimes leading to di⁄erent strategies (for
the strategic ones). The agent does neither know the type of his principal nor her lifetime. We
assume that he is not able to determine sequential equilibria of the complete equilibrium path and
to draw consistent probability assessments therefrom.4 As Camerer/Weigelt (1988, p. 2) suggest,
while it is plausible to assume principals (￿rms) are able to compute these sequential equilibria,
possibly by the help of consultants, agents (employees) are less likely to calculate them. Hence
we model agents as players whose subjective probability assessments for contract ful￿llment in
a given period only depend on observed ful￿llment decisions.5 This probability increases in
the number of ful￿llment decisions and decreases in the number of contract breaches. Trust,
measured by the agent￿ s subjective probability assessment that the contract will be honored
in the next period, crucially in￿ uences gains of trade because it determines costs of inducing
a given e⁄ort level.6 The core of the paper is that the history of play is the single source of
information the agent uses to determine the principal￿ s trustworthiness.
Related to our paper is the literature on reputation in repeated games (Mailath/Samuelson,
2006), speci￿cally non-zero-sum games with incomplete information (Aumann/Maschler, 1995;
Forges, 1992). Solutions to these games usually constitute a set of a possibly large number
of equilibria and there is no reliable prediction which will prevail.7 Put di⁄erently, various
trigger strategies can sustain an equilibrium (Friedman, 1971). To single out an equilibrium
an assumption concerning a particular punishment has to be made (e.g., Green/Porter, 1984),
3See also G￿rtler (2006).
4The critical discussion on the rationality assumption can be traced back at least to Simon (1955, p. 99),
who called for a "fairly drastic revision" of the concept of "economic man"; this critique was (presumably not
incidentally) published only one year after Savage￿ s "Foundations of Statistics" (1954), which is still the standard
reference for rational choice.
In Psychology, decision heuristics are considered the solution to the "tradeo⁄ [that] exists between cognitive
e⁄ort and judgmental accuracy" (Pitz/Sachs, 1984, p. 152) for boundedly rational individuals. Herrnstein/Prelec
(1991) conclude that optimality in individuals￿decisions given di⁄erent alternatives is the exception, not the rule.
It clearly follows that conventional rationality must be limited. For a discussion of limited rationality and its
impact on individual choice, see, for example, the reviews by Camerer (1995) and Conlisk (1996), and, speci￿cally
on decisions in a dynamic context, Bone et al. (2003), Camerer/Johnson (2004), and Herrnstein (1991).
5Psychological research suggests that if one is unable to calculate exact probabilities and strategies, observed
behavior is often the best predictor.
6That trust can increase performance has been shown by Zak/Knack (2001). In their model, however, agents
were allowed to spend resources on verifying information and thus preventing to be (possibly) cheated.
7See also Kreps (1990), p. 102f.
3or a certain level of "irrationality" is needed (Fudenberg/Maskin, 1986). While the cited work
considers simultaneous moves by players, our model is based on sequential play. It is therefore
most closely (although not closely) related to reputation models in ￿nancial contracting (e.g.
Boot et al., 1993; John/Nachman, 1985). Boot et al. (1993) analyze reputation formation
that may give highly-pro￿table principals (H principals in their formal diction) an advantage
over less pro￿table principals (L principals) when sequentially o⁄ering possibly di⁄erent types
of ￿nancial contracts. In their three-period model with fully rational agents a separating or a
pooling equilibrium may obtain. In either case, discretionary contracts are o⁄ered only in period
1 (and enforceable ones thereafter). Consequently, no strategy pro￿le for L-principals spanning
multiple periods is derived. Our model derives such a strategy pro￿le in a pooling equilibrium
over the agency￿ s course of T periods. As already reasoned above, a departure from the full
rationality assumption is necessary. One could therefore argue that our results relate more to
employer-employee relations while the analysis in Boot et al. (1993) probably better predicts
outcomes for games played between ￿rms.
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, we include trust and ￿associated with it
￿(reasonably) bounded rationality of agents in implicit contracts. Several important results
emerge from this analysis. Our results show that a su¢ ciently high level of ex ante trust can
o⁄set detrimental e⁄ects of a high discount rate. As results do not depend qualitatively on
the ex ante "distribution" of trust, they are generalizable in the sense that circumstances with
quite di⁄erent levels of ex ante trust lead to the same strategy patterns being optimal. For a
su¢ ciently low discount rate principals will honor the implicit contract (if at all) at the beginning
of an agency and dishonor it towards the end. The option of principals to switch back and forth
between ful￿llment and nonful￿llment is not exercised in equilibrium. This outcome mirrors
the grim trigger strategy which is usually exogenously entered into implicit contracting models
to sustain an equilibrium. Our paper can therefore provide a rationale and some justi￿cation
for the popular use of that approach. However, the equivalence depends on full memory of the
agent in our trust setting. In case the agent is not able to fully recall the entire history of play,
alternating strategies can become optimal, i.e. the principal switches back and forth between
ful￿llment and nonful￿llment. Depending on how many periods of play the agent recalls, we
can endogenously derive strategy pro￿les that mirror di⁄erent trigger strategies (that are also
exogenous to previous models). An optimal and a critical (or minimal) level of trust in the
agency will be identi￿ed as well.
Second, our results contribute to game theory by deriving strategy pro￿les as unique incomplete-
information equilibria in two-player sequential move games. The speci￿c equilibrium depends
on how bounded rational the agent is, i.e. whether he is able to recall the entire history of play
or only a limited number of periods. As Fudenberg/Maskin (1986) demonstrate for (n-person)
simultaneous move games that the level of "irrationality" determines a speci￿c equilibrium, we
do so for two-person sequential move games.
4Third, since trust has a moderating e⁄ect on performance - that is, trust provides the condition
for higher performance - we also contribute to the relatively undeveloped literature (Dirks/Ferrin,
2001, p. 451) in that respect.
Finally, our research has implications for performance evaluation practices which we discuss in
detail.
From here on we proceed as follows. As there are up to now only very few papers that formally
link trust to agency8, we begin with a short section on trust and on how it might be linked to
economic transactions. It includes a brief separation of trust from reputation. The following
section will then introduce the model. Section 4 contains equilibrium analysis. An extension of
the model, limited recall by the agent, is presented in section 5. In section 6 we interpret and
apply our ￿ndings. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 Trust in transactions
Trust is "something" that is present in many real-life situations although one may not very often
be aware of it.9 For example, you ask a local in a foreign city to show you the way to a famous
sight. Can you trust him (or her)? Will the prescribed way lead you to the sight or will you end
up in a neighborhood that you would not like to have visited otherwise? Many other examples
of trust quickly come to mind; you expect food you bought to have been produced in a hygienic
way; or, you expect the supplier to deliver in time and in good quality. What unites these (and
other) examples is the fact that an "expectation concerning the behavior of others" is involved,
which is a common understanding of trust.10 Luhmann (1979) argues that trust is linked with
complexity reduction or predictability.11 Consequently, trust allows for a speci￿c conjecture of
others￿behavior. Following Luhmann (1989), the trustor - as the subject of trust - puts trust
in the trustee - the object of trust - by o⁄ering a favour in advance, a ￿ Vorleistung￿(Luhmann,
1989, p. 23), to him, and the trustor then expects the trustee to not behave opportunistically.
Without such a ￿ Vorleistung￿as a form of trust, however, many (mutually bene￿cial) social or
economic interactions would simply not take place.12 The mutual bene￿t - besides complexity
8Rosen (1992, p. 187) links trust to agency, and Jones (1995) considers trust as a solution to agency problems.
Casadesus-Masanell (2004) formally models trust in a one-period agency, while Zak/Knack (2001) relate trust
between principals and agents to economic growth.
9This section draws from di⁄erent chapters in Nooteboom (2002). For a comprehensive elaboration on trust
in an economic context, see Nooteboom (2002) and the references therein; Hosmer (1995) and James (2002)
review the concept of trust and trustworthiness, and Bachmann (2001) analyzes the role of trust in co-ordinating
organizational relationships, including a discussion of various notions and theories of trust.
10Nooteboom, 2002, p. 6.
11Other accepted theories besides Luhmann￿ s Systems Theory are Coleman￿ s (1990) Rational Choice approach
and Giddens￿Structuration Theory (1976, 1984).
12See Bachmann (2001), p. 342.
5reduction - o⁄ers a convincing argument why we trust.13 Nevertheless, trust remains a risky
engagement (Luhmann, 1979) for both parties. As such, following Bachmann (2001, p. 342f.),
trust reduces risk but at the same time produces risk. If the trustee behaves opportunistically
it may lead to substantial losses on the side of the trustor. And one could argue that this is
exactly the risk one would like to minimize.
Trust as a mean to reduce uncertainty and complexity may come in two di⁄erent forms: personal
trust and system trust; and as Zucker (1986) argues, both forms are needed given the complex-
ity of today￿ s world. Personal trust is con￿dence in individuals, whereas system trust refers to
con￿dence in abstract systems.14 Given these two forms of trust and the above considerations,
a de￿nition of trust can be given: Trust in institutions or persons means to accept that they
may take advantage of you though you expect them not to do so. A question that inevitable
arises, though, is, (1) how can trust be established or ￿ produced￿? And (2) how, if at all, can it
be calculated? To begin with the ￿rst question, observed behavior like loyalty and commitment
in face-to-face contacts is very likely to establish personal trust; or think of internet reputa-
tion systems like ebay or amazon that work through feedback by buyers (Resnik/Zeckhauser,
2002). System trust can be built up by enforcing rules or certain standards. Sydow (1998, p.
54) coined the term ￿ trust-sensitive management￿ , meaning that managers acting on behalf of
the organization take into account how their actions and decisions a⁄ect trust that individual
employees have in the organization.15 As such, system trust can be easily related to accounting
and performance measurement. According to Kwon (2005), accounting may be perceived as
consisting of two stages: (1) aggregating underlying detailed data into "summary statistics" and
(2) mapping summary statistics into accounting reports.16 Either of the two stages can lead
to accounting noise, i.e. summary statistics do not (accurately) re￿ ect disaggregate data, or
accounting reports are prone to errors. Trust could then be de￿ned as the expectation of low
accounting noise.17
To turn to the second question, there has been and still is a debate as to whether trust, since
it entails risk, can be identi￿ed as a (subjective) probability. Dasgupta (1988), Kreps et al.
13Johnson (1750) o⁄ers an early and distinct answer to that question: ￿ It is happier to be sometimes cheated
than not to trust￿ . (Samuel Johnson (1750), "The Rambler"; quoted from Nooteboom (2002), p. 2.)
14Zucker (1986) refers to personal trust as process-based trust, and uses institutional-based trust as the term
for what is called system trust in Luhmann￿ s (1979) or Giddens￿(1990) terminology.
15See also Nooteboom (2002), pp. 84⁄.
16Cf. Kwon (2005), fn. 9.
17See Busco et al. (2006) for an analysis of how a management accounting system can act as a source of trust (in
a situation of change). Johansson/Baldvinsdottir (2003) provide evidence that performance evaluation is based
on trust and the production and reproduction of performance-evaluation routines.
For purposes here, we are not concerned about problems that arise when di⁄erent perceptions between the
organization (principal) and the employee (agent) are present. MacLeod (2003) analyzes such a situation in the
context of a non-availability of veri￿able performance measures, whereas Mitusch (2006) deals with the principal￿ s
ability to produce "hard facts", i.e. veri￿able performance measures.
6(1982), Mayer et al. (1995), and Mui et al. (2002) are examples of advocates in this respect.
Williamson (1993) and Nooteboom (2002, p. 40) have opposing views on this matter; the latter
objects trust as a subjective probability because it can become one, implying certainty; but trust
is related to uncertainty. He prefers to speak of trust as an "expectation", leaving room for
"residual uncertainty about agency and unforeseeable contingencies" (Nooteboom, 2002, p. 41).
For purposes of analytical research, e.g. in agency or contract theory, the distinction between
probability and expectation seems to be semantic or philosophical. What will qualitatively
matter for (our) modeling work is that with trust increasing between contract partners, higher-
stake transactions become possible, which leads back to trust allowing to predict the behavior
of contracting partners. In this vein, reputation is to be understood as a source of trust and
trustworthiness.18
3 The model
We consider a long-term agency relationship of T periods with spot (one period) contracts. The
agent￿ s action in period t is et 2 [0;1]; at cost c(et) = e2
t=2: Actions are observable but not
veri￿able. The principal￿ s expected gross outcome (before compensation) in period t is et: An
interpretation of this outcome is as follows: Let gross output in each period be a random variable
x 2 f0;1g independently distributed over time, then agent e⁄ort et can be considered as the
probability that x = 1 is achieved in period t. Expected gross outcome of period t then amounts
to E (xjet) = 1 ￿ et + 0 ￿ (1 ￿ et) = et:
At the end of every period t;t = 1;2;::;T; the agent receives compensation Wt; consisting of a
￿xed component st (which is guaranteed by the contract) and a possible bonus payment bt = vtet
given observation et
19 which is contingent on the principal￿ s decision to pay, i.e. to comply with
the implicit contract or not.20 The bonus equals a share of the expected output in period t with
sharing rate vt: Both parties are risk neutral and the agent￿ s reservation utility is zero in each
period.
Trust is modeled as the probability - from the agent￿ s point of view - that the principal honors the
implicit contract at the end of period t. We assume that there are di⁄erent types of principals in
18See Nooteboom (2002), p. 68f.
19Formally, the contract of period t can be thought of as consisting of an explicit ￿xed payment st; an e⁄ort
level et and an implicit bonus bt. If the agent has performed the pre-speci￿ed level of e⁄ort in period t, he is
eligible for bonus payment. Instead of including the desired e⁄ort level explicitly into the contract we let the
agent￿ s e⁄ort being induced via the bonus function bt = vtet, depending on the observed e⁄ort level et: As both
parties are risk-neutral the principal can induce every desired level et between 0 and 1 via the bonus function at
the same cost as with directly writing this level into the contract. Consequently, there is no loss of generality in
using this approach.
20Given that the outcome of the agency is binary in each period, the optimal compensation contract can be
expressed by a linear (bonus) contract without loss of generality. (See Christensen/Feltham, 2005, p. 153.)
7the market: honest (non-strategic) principals who always pay the implicit bonus and dishonest
(strategic) principals who only pay the bonus if it is optimal with respect to future payo⁄s.
Furthermore, principals have di⁄erent lifetimes leading to possibly di⁄erent ful￿llment strategies
of dishonest types. The agent does not know whether he is working for a strategic principal or
for a non-strategic one, nor does he know his principal￿ s lifetime. We assume that the agent
is bounded rational in the sense that he is not able to determine sequential equilibria of a
dynamic relationship facing di⁄erent types of principals with di⁄erent lifetimes and to draw
consistent probability beliefs therefrom. Instead, by entering the agency relation, the agent
has some initial trust. Speci￿cally, the agent knows a distribution g of the probability ￿ that
the contract is honored in the ￿rst period. The distribution g (￿) is a beta distribution with
parameters ￿ and ￿;￿;￿ > 0; and mean (initial trust) E(￿) = ￿
￿+￿. To prevent that the
agent assigns nonful￿llment of a contract unambiguously to a strategic principal, principals may
pretend to have been hit by a ￿nancial shock or other unforeseeable contingencies. In line with
Englmaier/Segal (2006) we assume that the agent cannot verify whether or not such a shock
has occurred. We analyze a relationship between the agent and a strategic principal who lives
for T periods.
While the agent knows the principal￿ s single period pro￿t function which allows him to calculate
the single period optimal contract, he is not able to strategically infer (or predict) the behavior of
di⁄erent types of principals unlike principals reveal their types by o⁄ering di⁄erent contracts.21
(In fact, assuming full rationality would lead to the infeasibility of a "trust solution" in our
model.) When the agent believes his ￿rm is of the strategic type, trust is completely lost and
he will never perform any productive e⁄ort.
Trust ￿the probability assessment that the contract will be ful￿lled ￿is exclusively determined
via Bayesian updating based on the history of ful￿llment decisions. Let ￿t 2 f0;1g indicate
nonful￿llment (￿t = 0) or ful￿llment (￿t = 1) of the implicit agreement in period t: Then the
expected probability at the beginning of period t that the bonus is paid at the end of the period








￿ + ￿ + t ￿ 1
: (1)
The trust dynamics assumed by (1) have been observed in experimental studies (Jonker et al.,
2004) and ￿eld studies (Butler, 1983).23
21There are a number of experimental studies showing that individuals fail to correctly apply backward induction
(see, e.g., Binmore et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2002; or Rapoport, 1997), or do not plan ahead (Bone et al., 2003;
Hey/Knoll, 2007).
22Note that, from an agent￿ s point of view, the principal￿ s decision to honor or dishonor the implicit part of
the contract is a draw from a Bernoulli distribution with ￿ as the unknown parameter. As this parameter has a
beta distribution with (￿;￿); the draw can be used to update the agent￿ s probability assessment of ￿ (DeGroot
(1970), p. 160).
23For further experimental evidence on reputation and trust formation, see Camerer/Weigelt (1988),
8At this point, a note on the functional assumption of the beta distribution seems appropriate.
The beta distribution is rich in the sense that it includes quite di⁄erent bell-shaped, unimodal,
and bimodal forms (with modes at zero and/or one). Therefore, virtually any ex ante assessment
of trust can be mapped. Updating in light of implicit bonus payments or not occurs technically
by applying Bayes￿rule, so beliefs are consistent in that respect. But the updating process is
intuitively appealing, too, which it should be in light of the bounded rationality assumption.
Starting with an initial assessment the agent views every ful￿llment decision as a sign that the
principal is of the "good type", and every nonful￿llment as a sign for the "bad type". In that
respect trust evolves according to a simple adaptive learning process.
The intuitive functional form allows for closed-form solutions and will be helpful to derive
tractable results if more structure is added to the model. One possible extension could be trust-
enhancing measures taken by the principal. Following Lukas (2005, p. 197), a measure m would
impact distributional parameters as follows:
￿m = ￿ + m ￿ ￿
￿m = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ m;
where ￿;0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1; is the principal￿ s choice parameter indicating how e⁄ectively the measure is
implemented. The mean obtains as
E(￿ j m;￿) =
￿ + m ￿ ￿
￿ + m ￿ ￿ + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ m
=
￿ + m ￿ ￿
￿ + ￿ + m
:
As an example, think of m as a code of ethics that is adopted. If employees observe the ￿rm
and its managers live up to the code (￿ ! 1); trust increases (as ￿m > ￿ and ￿m = ￿ lead to an
increasing mean of the distribution). Conversely, non-compliance with the code (￿ ! 0) leads
to lower trust.
4 Equilibrium analysis
4.1 Beliefs and strategies
At the beginning of every contracting period each type of principal o⁄ers a linear contract Wt.
As the agent knows the principal￿ s one shot problems, he is also able to determine the optimal
current period contract given the principal is willing to pay the bonus. Denote b￿
t the optimal




by the agent. Notice that in our model all types of principals are equally
productive in each period they live. As periods are independent in terms of stochastic output,
the optimal bonus b￿
t is independent of a principal￿ s lifetime. To sustain our equilibrium we
Kagel/Roth (1995), or Mayhew (2001).
9impose the following out-of-equilibrium belief for the agent: If a bonus bt 6= b￿
t is o⁄ered to the
agent he assumes that this o⁄er comes from a strategic principal. This belief is plausible for
a bounded rational agent who presumes that an honest type will not deviate from her optimal
bonus b￿
t. Given this belief a bonus o⁄er bt 6= b￿
t implies that trust becomes zero and all future
gains from the agency are lost. Hence, in equilibrium all types of principals will o⁄er a bonus
b￿
t in period t. We determine the equilibrium bonus in the next subsection.
4.2 The single-period problem
To determine the solution to the principal￿ s multi-period decision problem, we consider ￿rst a
single arbitrary period of the relationship between principal and agent. From the above section
we know that the equilibrium contract o⁄er of each type of principal is equal to the optimal
contract that would be o⁄ered by a principal who is willing to honor the implicit contract. The
corresponding optimization problem is given by24:
max
s;v
(e ￿ ve ￿ s) (2)
s.t.
s + E(￿)ve ￿ c(e) ￿ 0 (3)
e = argmax
b e
s + E(￿)vb e ￿ c(b e) (4)
The principal maximizes her expected output net of the agent￿ s expected compensation,
E (e ￿ b ￿ s) = (e ￿ ve ￿ s), taking into account that the contract must be individually rational
(3) and incentive compatible (4). The agent￿ s objective function is expected compensation,
E (s + b) = s + E(￿)ve, less cost of e⁄ort, c(e). Incentive compatibility condition (4) can also
be written as
e = E(￿)v:
It is obvious that the level of trust impacts the e⁄ort choice; higher levels of trust allow to
implement higher e⁄ort levels for a given bonus rate v:
With a binding participation constraint, the principal￿ s optimization program simpli￿es to
max
v
















24As all period are alike except for induced trust we dropped the time indices.
10If trust was perfect, E(￿) = 1, (5) and (6) would lead to
e￿ = v￿ = b￿ = 1
and a benchmark surplus of SH = 1
2 when the principal honors (H) the contract.
With trust being imperfect, E(￿) < 1, ine¢ ciency results. When the principal honors the
contract, her expected surplus as a function of induced trust E(￿) is given by









while the agent always receives his reservation utility in equilibrium. Imperfect trust does not
restrict the set of implementable actions. The principal could always set v = 1=E (￿) to induce
￿rst-best incentives. However, implementing the ￿rst best action is too costly for the principal if
E(￿) < 1. Similar to G￿rtler (2006), the agent weights his bonus with the probability of contract
ful￿llment but the principal has to bear the full cost of compensation. Hence, the optimal bonus
b￿ solves a trade-o⁄ between incentives and (imperfect) trust: The lower the level of trust the
higher the required bonus to induce a given level of e⁄ort and - at the same time - the higher
the cost of imperfect trust (in terms of expected compensation) resulting from the distortion in
the agent￿ s incentives. According to (7) this cost is given by e(v ￿ e) = vE (￿)(v ￿ vE (￿)):
With perfect trust, e = v, this term vanishes, but with imperfect trust this cost is increasing in
the bonus rate v: Ine¢ ciency here results already from limited trust.
If the principal dishonors (D) the implicit contract, the resulting surplus is
SD = v￿ (1 + v￿E(￿)) ￿ c(e￿) =
E(￿)(4 ￿ E(￿))
2(E(￿) ￿ 2)
2 > SH: (8)
4.3 The multi-period problem
In the multi-period problem let ￿t = f￿1;::;￿tg be the history of play up to the beginning of
period (t + 1) determined by the sequence of past bonus payment decisions. The principal







be the expected probability (from the agent￿ s perspective given his adaptive learning







































11A principal￿ s strategy ￿ =(￿1;￿2;:::;￿T) speci￿es for each period t an optimal decision ￿t. The






indicates the principal￿ s payo⁄ from the agency in period t given strategy ￿:
Because nonful￿llment is optimal in period T; ￿T = 0; the principal￿ s non-reneging constraint of




















where ￿i = 1
(1+r)i is the discount factor of an agency with interest rate r ￿ 0 . Notice that
the optimal decision in period t requires anticipating optimal future decisions. Hence, the set
of (T ￿ 1) non-reneging constraints is a result of a dynamic optimization problem. To clarify
that non-reneging constraints must be evaluated at optimal future decisions we write ￿i￿1￿ and
e ￿
i￿1￿
; respectively. ￿i￿1￿ captures the history up to period i > t; given the implicit bonus has
been paid in period t and e ￿
i￿1￿






















The principal￿ s optimal strategy ￿￿ is the solution to the following dynamic optimization prob-





as a function of the history ￿t￿1 by maximizing period t0s contribution plus optimal









We call Pt the principal￿ s value function of period t.
Equivalently, de￿ne












t (￿t￿1)(1 ￿ ￿t)￿t￿1




Notice that the equilibrium path of ful￿llment or nonful￿llment decisions is not trivial in this
model. Although we assume a stationary production process, periods di⁄er in the level of trust
12and this level determines the cost of inducing a given e⁄ort. The principal￿ s optimal dynamic
bonus payment strategy solves the following trade-o⁄: If she does not pay the implicit bonus
today she earns surplus SD instead of SH, but she also damages trust such that future payo⁄s
are getting lower. In addition, with an increasing discount rate the value of future surpluses
decreases.
To answer the question whether a higher level of initial trust can compensate for a higher
discount rate, observe that both expected surplus from ful￿llment, SH
t ; and from nonful￿llment,
SD
















(2 ￿ ￿t￿1)3 > 0 (15)
Since (14) and (15) are positive in every period given any history of play, a higher ex ante level
of trust leads to a positive a¢ ne transformation of (13) and thus increases the value of trade.
Proposition 1 (a) With an increasing interest rate r; ful￿llment of implicit contracts becomes
(weakly) less attractive. The expected equilibrium surplus is decreasing in r:
(b) A higher level of ex ante trust o⁄sets, at least partially, the detrimental e⁄ect of a higher
discount rate and increases the value of trade in the agency.
Proof. See appendix.
If it is optimal for the principal to ful￿ll the implicit contract in some period, trust builds up
according to the agent￿ s adaptive learning process which enables higher future surpluses. If
the discount rate r is increasing, however, the value of future surpluses decreases such that
building up trust becomes less attractive. Hence, the number of ful￿llments up to some period
t is weakly decreasing in r as the optimal level of trust induced in period t is weakly decreasing
in r (part (a) of the proposition). One immediate conclusion from this proposition is that if
complete nonful￿llment is optimal for some discount rate r it must be optimal for all discount
rates higher than r. Part (b) of proposition 1 accords with intuition as a higher level of trust
ceteris paribus increases the value of trade in the agency.
Now the strategy ￿ will be analyzed in depth to derive general patterns of decisions. We seek
to characterize strategies as alternating or non-alternating strategies ￿rst.
De￿nition 1 (Alternating strategy) A strategy ￿ is called alternating, if it features more than
one switch between ful￿llment and nonful￿llment during the agency.
De￿nition 2 (Non-alternating strategy) A strategy ￿ is called non-alternating, if it features
exactly one switch between ful￿llment and nonful￿llment during the agency (or vice versa).








. We further know from (15) and
(14) that both SH
t and SD
t are increasing functions of ￿t￿1; the level of trust generated up to
period t. The level of trust in period t; ￿t￿1, is increasing in the number of ful￿llments up to
period t (see (1)).
De￿nition 3 (Strict strategy) A strategy ￿ is called strict, if it features the same decision in
every period.










for strict ful￿llment, ￿ = 1; where ￿￿
t￿1 indicates the level of trust at the beginning of period t
contingent on ￿. Given (14) and (15), notice SD(￿) is a strictly monotone increasing concave
function of t and SH(￿) is a strictly monotone increasing convex function of t. This leads to the
following conclusion.
Conclusion 1 There exists a threshold value e T of the length of the contracting relationship T
such that strict ful￿llment dominates strict nonful￿llment, if T > e T .
Now consider a relationship of T periods and assume that the principal￿ s strategy exhibits









t￿1)￿t￿1 : Next consider a variation such that
the principal chooses nonful￿llment in periods t = 1;::;(T ￿ t0); and ful￿llment from t = (T ￿









the previous strategy the total number of ful￿llments and nonful￿llments is identical but timing
di⁄ers: Under the ￿rst strategy there is ful￿llment for the ￿rst t0 periods whereas under the
second strategy there is ful￿llment for the last t0 periods. Assume no discounting, ￿ = 1: Then
timing of ful￿llment decisions is material only with regard to the induced level of trust. As SD
t
and SH
t are increasing functions of ￿t￿1; it is always optimal to build up trust ￿rst, i.e. S > S0:
The surplus from the ith ful￿llment under S is higher than the ith ful￿llment under S0 for all
t0￿ful￿llments, and the surplus of the jth nonful￿llment under S is higher than the surplus
from the jth nonful￿llment in S0 for all (T ￿t0)￿nonful￿llments. We summarize our ￿ndings in
proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Given the interest rate r is su¢ ciently low, ful￿llment of the implicit part of the
contract will be observed - if at all - at the beginning of the relationship (and correspondingly:
nonful￿llment of the implicit part of the contract will be observed at end of the relationship).
Putting conclusion (1) and proposition (2) together, either a non-alternating strategy starting
with ful￿llment or a strict nonful￿llment strategy will be observed. Knowing that in any period
14Figure 1: Optimal strategies contingent on ￿
￿ given any history ￿￿￿1, SD
￿ (￿￿￿1) > SH
￿ (￿￿￿1), the strategy "strict ful￿llment" over a contract
length of ￿ periods is dominated by the strategy (￿1 = 1;￿2 = 1;:::;￿￿￿1 = 1;￿￿ = 0): (The latter
simply means that strategic principals will renege in the last period.) By backward induction,
we ￿nd the threshold period where - given the non-reneging constraint for period 1 is ful￿lled -
the principal switches from ful￿llment to nonful￿llment.
What if the interest rate is not su¢ ciently low? Here the principal faces a trade-o⁄ between










there might be an
incentive to dishonor contracts in early periods if the discount rate is high. Consider the extreme
case ￿ ! 0: Then only ￿rst period payo⁄s matter (in our model discounting begins in period 2).
We obtain S = SH
1 (￿0)￿1 + SD
1 (￿0)(1 ￿ ￿1); which is maximized by setting ￿1 = 0. To clarify
the trade-o⁄, consider the following example:
Example 1 Assume a three-period relationship with strategies
f￿1 = (1;0;0);￿2 = (0;0;0);￿3 = (0;1;0);and ￿4 = (1;1;0)g; assuming ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1=100.
Figure 1 plots the strategy dependent surplus levels (Si ￿ S (￿i)) against ￿: With in￿nitely high
discounting (￿ ! 0) strategies ￿2 and ￿3 are optimal, because both dishonor the agreement in
period 1 (which will not be discounted). Increasing ￿ from the origin, initially S2 rises stronger
than S3 as the second period payo⁄ under ￿2, SD
2 (￿1), is higher than under ￿3, SH
2 (￿1), and
the e⁄ect of ful￿lling the second period contract on the third period payo⁄ under ￿3 does not
preponderate because with ￿ relatively small the third period payo⁄ is of little value. As ￿ is
increasing further the e⁄ect reverses. Now the advantage of having built up trust in period 2
becomes dominant and strategy ￿3 yields a higher surplus than ￿2. If the discount rate r becomes
15su¢ ciently small, ￿ ! 1; the advantage of early trust building appears and ￿1 dominates ￿3:
(Depending on the numerical values of the example ￿4 will never be optimal here). What becomes
obvious from this example is that with r being su¢ ciently high alternating strategies may be
optimal.
If the time value of money is irrelevant marginal gains from ful￿llment in terms of trust are
highest at the beginning of the agency and marginal losses due to nonful￿llment are lowest at
the end of the agency. Hence, if it is optimal to build up trust during the agency the principal
will do so at the beginning of the relationship because she can harvest high trust over the longest
period of time. To provide some more intuition for the result note that the agent￿ s belief about
the principal￿ s trustworthiness rests on only a few observations at the beginning of the agency
but on many observations later in the agency. Therefore, the principal￿ s decisions early in the
agency have a stronger impact on the agent￿ s belief than the ones later in the agency. This
feature of the agent￿ s adaptive learning process (which is consistent with Bayesian inference)
creates e⁄ective incentives for trust formation through early ful￿llments.25 Once the principal
decides not to ful￿ll the contract in a period it must be optimal to dishonor in all subsequent
periods. As such the strategy pattern which is endogenous equilibrium behavior in our model
resembles the grim-trigger strategy that exogenously enters into previous implicit contracting
models to sustain an equilibrium.
5 Limited recall by the agent
In this section we investigate if and how the principal￿ s optimal decisions change when the agent
is not able to recall an arbitrarily long sequence of play. Technically, the level of trust that
determines the value of the agency in any given period ￿ will now depend upon a history of ￿F
periods prior to it, where F denotes forgetfulness. To cut-o⁄ the history of play at a certain
point is a simpli￿cation of exponential or power forgetting functions proposed by psychologists26,
or can be interpreted as the well-known recency bias in decision analysis.27 The crucial change
for the principal - compared to the situation in the previous section - is that the decision in a
given period t in￿ uences future periods only up to period t+￿F, and repercussions from previous
decisions are limited to periods t￿￿F;::;t￿1. For instance assume ￿F = 3 and ￿ = ￿ = 1. Then
25The same e⁄ect occurs if a sample from a normal distribution is used to update the mean of a normally
distributed variable: The higher the variance of the prior distribution, the stronger the impact of the sample on
the posterior mean.
26See Wixted (2004) for a review of - and for non-psychologists an introduction into - the topic.
27Basu/Waymire (2006) and Basu et al. (2007) show that recordkeeping - e.g. as required by modern accounting
systems- enhances trust and therefore enables complex economics transactions. The need for recordkeeping to
support memory by the human brain sustains our assumption of limited recall in the ￿rst place. As in practice,
however, recordkeeping in an employer-employee relationship will not be observed, we do not consider formal
recordkeeping as a device to support a more e⁄ective recall by the agent.
16starting with initial trust of ￿0 = ￿
￿+￿ = 1
2 the evolution of trust assuming decision sequence
(0;1;0;0) is given by ￿1 = ￿
￿+￿+1 = 1
3; ￿2 = ￿+1
￿+￿+1+1 = 1
2; and ￿3 = 1
1+1 = 1
2, where at the
beginning of the fourth period the agent does not recall initial trust but his adaptive learning
rests only on the last three periods (0;1;0).
Whenever the principal does not want to pay the implicit bonus ￿F- times in a row trust will
be completely destroyed and the agent will choose no e⁄ort in the following period.28 But what
about a non bonus payment following a period with an e⁄ort level of zero? Here we have to clarify
what actually constitutes "nonful￿llment". In the word￿ s literal sense, a non bonus payment
subsequent to zero e⁄ort cannot be nonful￿llment because payment accords with promise to pay.
However, we consider a non bonus payment following zero e⁄ort as a period where no implicit
agreement could be established; it constitutes nonful￿llment. Hence, the game is e⁄ectively over
after ￿F nonful￿llments in a row. In the period following a series of ￿F breaches of contract
the agent chooses no e⁄ort and accordingly receives no bonus payment from the principal. This
period is interpreted as a "no implicit contract period" by the agent such that he does not
perform e⁄ort in the subsequent period and consequently receives no bonus. This procedure
repeats until the end of the relationship.
We consider ￿rst the extreme case of ￿F = 1 and then proceed to ￿F ￿ 2.
5.1 One-period recall by the agent
If the agent recalls only one period of play, her projection for the upcoming period will be that
the principal will repeat her decision from the previous period. Formally we obtain
￿t￿1 = Prob(￿t = 1 j ￿t￿1) =
(
1 if ￿t￿1 = 1






= Prob(￿t = 0 j ￿t￿1) =
(
0 if ￿t￿1 = 1
1 if ￿t￿1 = 0
: (17)
At ￿rst sight, (16) and (17) seem to render alternating strategies infeasible. The following
proposition con￿rms the conjecture and describes the principal￿ s optimal strategy.
Proposition 3 Let ￿F = 1; then
(a) given r is su¢ ciently low, the principal￿ s optimal strategy is to ful￿ll the implicit part of the
contract in all but the ￿nal period,
(b) if r is su¢ ciently large the principal chooses ￿1 = 0.
28Ittner et al. (2003) provide an empiricial example where individual balanced scorecards were removed because
employees did not trust the scorecard measures anymore after supervisors ignored a number of them or attached
di⁄erent weights to them from quarter to quarter.
17Short recall on the side of the agent approximates the cooperative solution very closely if the
discount rate is su¢ ciently low. Strategic principals are forced to ful￿ll the implicit part of the
contract as nonful￿llment once prevents "cooperative play" in all future periods. As such, the
optimal strategy is endogenous and resembles the grim-trigger strategy - defect once and coop-
erative play is ruled out for all future periods - that is usually exogenous to implicit contracting
models.
5.2 Multi-period recall by the agent
In this section we assume the agent is able to recall the sequence of play for ￿F periods; 2 ￿
￿F ￿ T. Limited recall has two fundamental e⁄ects. First, if principals defect ￿F￿times in
a row they never regain a chance to build up trust, that is, they realize zero surpluses for all
periods to come. Second, a decision in a given period t in￿ uences future periods only up to
period t+￿F. Hence, trust reducing nonful￿llment decisions will eventually be cleared from the
agent￿ s memory o⁄ering a chance for principals to not-ful￿ll again.
>From previous sections it is straightforward that if the discount rate is very high the principal
decides not to ful￿ll the ￿rst period contract and subsequent periods are immaterial. For r
su¢ ciently small it can never be optimal to dishonor the contract ￿F-times in a row if there are
subsequent periods to play. To single out candidates for optimality and intuitively approach a
(possibly) unique sequential equilibrium, let the optimal decision for some period b t be ￿b t = 0.
Moving on period by period, the principal will ful￿ll the contract - at the latest in period
t = b t + ￿F ￿ 1 - because another nonful￿llment would reduce all future surpluses from trade
to zero. The principal has to trade-o⁄ surpluses from repeated nonful￿llments against those
arising from ful￿llment based on ceteris paribus higher trust levels. In other words it could be
optimal to either frequently switch back and forth between ful￿llment and nonful￿llment or to
insert only few nonful￿llments into the (otherwise) strict ful￿llment strategy.
Now assume there is a time span during which principals dishonor the implicit contract d times




. By induction, if it is optimal to dishonor
implicit contracts in periods t = b t;b t+1;::;b t+(d￿1); it will again be optimal to do so in periods
t = b t+d+￿F;b t+d+￿F +1;::;b t+d+￿F +d; after full trust has been reestablished by ful￿llment
decisions in periods t = b t+d;b t+d+1;::;b t+d+￿F ￿1: Let us call the decision sequence ￿R(￿F;d)
of ￿F ful￿llments and d nonful￿llments a representative sequence.
Lemma 1 Assume a repetition of the representative sequence ￿R(￿F;d);d > 0; is an element of
the principal￿ s optimal strategy: Then, given r is su¢ ciently small, the number of nonful￿llments
d contained in ￿R(￿F;d) must be placed in a row, i.e. the representative sequence shows at most
one change where the principal switches from ful￿llment to nonful￿llment.
Proof. See appendix.
18If more than one nonful￿llment in the sequence is optimal, d > 1; all nonful￿llments must
be placed in a row as otherwise a sequence of ￿F ful￿llments is discontinued, destroying full
trust and leading to a strictly lower payo⁄ in the representative sequence. Lemma 1 indicates
that switching back and forth between one ful￿llment and one nonful￿llment cannot be optimal
equilibrium behavior, just as it was not under perfect recall either. Thus the result holds even
in light of the agent￿ s limited recall. This is noteworthy because the latter prevents erosion of
marginal gains from ful￿llment due to a constant sample size of ￿F periods for trust formation.
Until now we analyzed representative sequences assuming d > 0 being optimal, showing that it
cannot be optimal to destroy full trust by playing alternating nonful￿llment strategies. But we
neither proved optimality of d > 0 nor did we describe the optimal way to induce perfect trust
from the beginning of the relationship. Furthermore, we did not care about the ￿nal periods
of the relationship that are di⁄erent to "regular" periods as no long-term e⁄ects need to be
considered. The following proposition describes a principal￿ s optimal strategy for a low discount
rate.
Proposition 4 Given r is su¢ ciently small. The principal￿ s optimal strategy is to ful￿ll the
contract in periods 1 to ￿F and subsequently dishonors the implicit contract d > 0 times; then
the principal selects this representative sequence ￿R(￿F;d) as often as possible given there are
at least ￿F periods remaining to harvest full trust. The ￿nal periods are subject to separate
optimization.
The principal￿ s optimal strategy is to induce full trust just at the beginning of the relationship
and then to absorb the bene￿ts from perfect trust by not paying the implicit bonus d times in
a row. This procedure will be repeated as long as possible, i.e. establishing full trust is optimal
as long as there are at least ￿F periods to harvest full trust. The remaining periods exhibit a
"last-round e⁄ect" for the principal - including a nonful￿llment in the last period- such that
they are subject to separate optimization.
De￿nition 4 (Optimal trust) The average level of trust in the representative sequence, ￿F
d+￿F ,
is called the optimal level of trust in the agency.
De￿nition 5 (Critical trust level) The level of trust the principal will not go below, ￿F￿d
￿F ; is
called the critical level of trust in the agency.
Proposition 5 The number of nonful￿llments d contained in the representative sequence ￿R(￿F;d)
is weakly increasing in ￿F; the number of periods the agent recalls.
Corollary 1 The optimal level of trust is generally lower than 1. Neither the optimal level of
trust nor the critical level of trust is monotone in the number of periods the agent recalls. Both
increase in ￿F with rollbacks whenever an additional nonful￿llment becomes optimal.
19Before a numerical example highlighting the results from propositions 4 and 5 will be presented,
an intuitive explanation for the propositions and its proofs should be given. If full trust is based
on only a few observations then nonful￿llment will destroy trust severely, whereas the adverse
impact of nonful￿llment is less severe if full trust is based on a larger number of observations.
For example, if ￿F = 2; nonful￿llment (after full trust has been reestablished) reduces the level
of trust from 2=2 to just 1=2; compare it with ￿F = 10 : Nonful￿llment after full trust has
been reestablished lowers trust from 10=10 to 9=10: Therefore, additional nonful￿llment(s) may
be optimal if the number of periods the agent recalls increases. The fact that the number of
optimal nonful￿llments increases only weakly in the number of periods the agent recalls leads
to non-monotonicity of the optimal and the critical level of trust, respectively, in the agency.
Therefore, equal values of these levels can be reconciled with quite di⁄erent degrees of the agent￿ s
bounded rationality, i.e. how able he is to recall sequences of play.
Example 2 The following calculation exempli￿es the results of propositions 4 and 5. Assume
the agency lasts for 30 periods. Let the prior distribution of trust be given by ￿ = ￿ = 5:
Discounting is either irrelevant (￿ = 1), or su¢ ciently low (￿ = 0:909) to ensure that building
up trust is potentially viable. Calculation of strategy contingent payo⁄s yields the following
numbers:
￿F strategy pro￿le* (￿1;￿2;:::;￿30) S(￿ = 0:909) S(￿ = 1)
2 1 29 ￿ 1;0 4:11 15:24
2 2 ￿ 1;13 ￿ f0;1g;1;0 3:08 9:46
3 10 ￿ f2 ￿ 1;0g 5:02 17:24
4 4 27 ￿ 1;3 ￿ 0 3:82 14:95
5 4 ￿ 1;12 ￿ f0;1g;3 ￿ 0 3:36 9:86
6 6 ￿ f4 ￿ 1;0g 4:34 15:78
7 5 ￿ f4 ￿ 1;0;0g 4:30 15:38
6 8 27 ￿ 1;3 ￿ 0 3:55 14:77
9 6 ￿ 1;11 ￿ f0;1g;0;0 3:37 10:36
10 4 ￿ f6 ￿ 1;0g;0;0 3:89 15:29
11 2 ￿ f6 ￿ 1;0;0g;6 ￿ 1;0;4 ￿ 1;3 ￿ 0 3:92 14:57
12 2 ￿ f6 ￿ 1;0;0g;6 ￿ 1;5 ￿ 1;3 ￿ 0 3:91 15:02
13 2 ￿ f6 ￿ 1;3 ￿ 0g;9 ￿ 1;3 ￿ 0 3:88 14:60
Table 1: Strategies and payo⁄s under limited recall
(Optimal strategies in bold.)
* Hint: A strategy pro￿le reads as follows: 2￿f6￿1;0;0g;11￿1;3￿0 - play the (representative)
sequence consisting of 6 ful￿llments followed by 2 ful￿llments twice; then play 11 ful￿llments
followed by 3 nonful￿llments.
20Table 1 compares strategy contingent payo⁄s if the history of play the agent recalls amounts to
￿F = 2 (4;6) periods, respectively. Optimal strategies are highlighted in bold. They have three
features in common: (1) at the beginning, full trust is established (which relates to part (a)
of proposition 4); (2) the representative sequence is repeated as often as possible; (3) the ￿nal
periods are subject to separate optimization. For ￿F = f2;4g; the optimal number of defections
d within the representative sequence is 1. For example, strategy 7 having two defections within
the representative sequence is inferior to strategy 6, the (optimal) strategy with one defection.
If ￿F = 6; d increases to 2. Taken together, d is weakly increasing in ￿F: Also note that the
￿nal periods of play - decisions noted after braces - may be subject to separate optimization.
Speci￿cally, compare strategies 11 and 12. With discounting given ￿ = 0:909; strategy 11 is
preferred to 12 showing a nonful￿llment after reestablishing full trust subsequent to completing
the representative sequence twice. Without discounting, or, in terms of proposition 4, with
su¢ ciently low discounting, strategy 12 starting with additional ful￿llments and ending with
nonful￿llments is superior to the alternating strategy in 11.
The optimal and critical level of trust, respectively, obtain as follows:
￿F 1 2 3 4 5 6
optimal trust 1 2/3 3/4 4/5 5/6 3/4
critical trust 1 1/2 2/3 3/4 4/5 5/8
Table 2: Optimal trust and critical trust
The optimal alternating strategies under limited recall of at least two periods of play, ￿F ￿ 2;
correspond to trigger strategies like "defect d + 1 times in a row and cooperative play is ruled
out for all future periods". As d is weakly increasing in ￿F, the optimal strategies form a subset
of trigger strategies that is usually treated as exogenous in implicit contract models. Our model
derives these strategies endogenously.
6 Interpretation, application and extensions
The results in this paper that have empirical support or suggest empirical research can be
summarized as follows:
￿ There is an optimal level of trust and achieving or maintaining full trust is generally not
optimal. However, there also exists a critical trust level that the principal (￿rm) will not
go below. Di⁄erent degrees of bounded rationality can be reconciled with identical levels
of optimal and critical trust, respectively.
￿ Equal trust measures (optimal trust, critical trust) can be reconciled with di⁄erent degrees
of the agent￿ s bounded rationality.
21￿ Improving performance measurement systems (PMS) can improve performance via trust
as moderator.
One could interpret the average level of trust prevalent in exchange relationships as optimal
trust (Wicks et al., 1999). We demonstrate that such an optimal level of trust exists if agents or
employees are unable to recall entire histories of play (section 5). Trust dynamics as suggested
by the optimality of alternating strategies in the model have been observed in the laboratory
(Jonker et al., 2004), i.e. trust can be rebuilt. Besides forgetfulness limiting the number of
periods which determine trust relevant for a particular period, one could also think of trust as
a replaceable intangible asset with ￿nite life of ￿F-periods. The optimal trust level depends
on situational parameters and is given by ￿F
￿F+d < 1, indicating that achieving and maintaining
maximum trust is not in every case viable. A prominent example is (or used to be) the practice of
lifetime employment by Japanese ￿rms which analysts believe to represent a too heavy ￿nancial
burden.29 To the other end, there exists a critical level of trust that ￿rms optimally do not go
below. Since the number of nonful￿llments only weakly increases in the agent￿ s recall capabilities,
the critical level of trust tends to increase in the number of periods the agent recalls. If ￿in
empirical research ￿the latter is proxied by tenure in the ￿rm, then longer tenure translates
into higher trust levels which in turn increase gains from trade. Or, in other words, subjective
incentives become more e⁄ective. As such our model provides an analytical rationale for Gibbs
et al.￿ s (2004) empirical ￿nding that subjective incentives can be more e⁄ective when trust ￿
proxied by tenure ￿is higher.
In recent papers Basu/Waymire (2006) and Basu/Dickhaut et al. (2007) emphasize the bene￿ts
of recordkeeping in complex economic transactions. Basu/Dickhaut et al. (2007) show in a
complex multi-period trust game experiment that recordkeeping leads to higher trust and induces
higher reciprocity. If recordkeeping is possible (in the experiment) the trustor (investor) better
recalls past transactions and trust formation by higher reciprocity of the trustee shows. In
contrast to these papers we demonstrate that limited recall by the agent may lead to improved
transactions. As the agent refuses cooperation for all future if he only recalls breaches of contract,
shorter recall by the agent forces the principal to reciprocate more often.30
In our model, trust has a moderating e⁄ect on performance as trust "a⁄ects how one assesses
the future behavior of another party ... and how one interprets past (or present) actions of the
other party".31 Bonus payments increase trust which in turn leads to higher performance. Such
trust in the principal￿ s willingness to pay can also be identi￿ed as trust in the performance mea-
surement system (PMS) or system trust (Luhmann, 1979), i.e. the likelihood that (perceived)
individual performance and performance appraisal coincide. For that purpose, E(￿); the proba-
29Cf. Wicks et al. (1999), p. 101.
30Cf. optimal trust for ￿
F = f4;6g in table 2.
31Dirks/Ferrin (2001), p. 456.
22bility that the principal pays the bonus at the end of the period would have to be reinterpreted
as the level of trust the agent puts into the performance evaluation process. In line with em-
pirical evidence (Folger/Konovsky, 1989), the importance of transparent and fair performance
appraisals has been pointed out by several authors, e.g. Campbell et al. (1998), Baker (1990),
or Milkovich/Newman (2002, p. 302). The present model formalizes bene￿ts of such a trust
"investment" - the principal￿ s decision to pay a bonus could be seen as an investment -, but
the optimal trust level smaller than one suggests that de￿nite fairness or transparency of PMS
cannot be an objective for ￿rms. Therefore, disagreements of employees with their performance
appraisals (Campbell/Lee, 1988) are likely to persist.32
In similar vein, empirical research suggests trust between employee and supervisor (Reinke, 2003;
Ittner et al., 2003) or trust in the agency in general (Condrey, 1992; Hedge, 2000) as a crucial
in￿ uence on acceptance of performance appraisal systems. Although the model presentation
and interpretation so far focuses on subjective performance measures, similar concerns can be
expected even if veri￿able accounting measures are used for performance appraisals. As Hop-
wood (1972, p. 157) notes, accounting PMS can often be improved but not as much to achieve
the "ideal system", which would correctly mirror all dimensions of employee performance. As a
consequence, even accounting information should be used with discretion in performance evalu-
ation.33 Here, numbers or outcomes may not be disputed but the cause of numbers (Campbell
et al., 1998, p. 133). Taking this insight into our model, both principal and agent agree on
observed agent e⁄ort or performance and if it was a veri￿able accounting number a contract
could be written on it. But if agent motivation depends on his willingness to accept the cause
his trust in the performance evaluation process would be important. Low accounting noise and
a just and transparent evaluation will certainly foster trust in that respect.
As another interpretation of the optimal trust level, consider rapidly changing environments
which are likely to be represented by a shorter "life" of trust, i.e. investments in trust would be
needed more often. While there is evidence that accounting for trust can help maintain or rebuild
trust (Busco et al., 2006; Johansson/Baldvinsdottir, 2003), it remains open to what extent that
should be done. Since the optimal level of trust, ￿F
￿F+d; is increasing in ￿F but d is only weakly
increasing in ￿F, an additional prediction emerging from the analysis is that in rapidly changing
environments, possibly manifested by repeated restructuring and/or managerial turnover, the
optimal level of trust is lower than in stable environments. (Note that investments in trust
are viable in both scenarios.) In fact, there is some empirical evidence (Coyle-Shapiro, 2000;
Robinson, 1996; Robinson/Rousseau, 1994) that globalization and organizational restructuring
32Although this may sound trivial it is actually not. Ittner/Larcker (2003) report that not setting the right
performance targets is a common mistake in non￿nancial performance measurement. For example, managers tried
to achieve 100% customer satisfaction because they believed it would pay o⁄.
33See also Murphy/Oyer (2003).
23have lead to more frequent breach of implicit contracts or the so-called psychological contract.34
However, the analysis in this paper also suggests that trust measurement in employer-employee
relations could come to equal results in di⁄erently stable environments because optimal trust as
well as critical trust are not monotone in the parameter ￿F. Interpreting that parameter as the
degree of the agent￿ s bounded rationality, again equal trust measures can go hand in hand with
di⁄erent degrees of bounded rationality.
Adding more structure to the model would allow to further clarify the dependence of optimal
and critical trust on other parameters and to derive more testable hypotheses. Such extended
model speci￿cations could then be tested in the laboratory. An interesting feature of the model
carrying over to them is the range of possible trust levels because experimental trust games
usually allow only for the alternative to fully trust or not trust at all.
7 Summary and conclusion
The results of our paper relate to contract design and implicit incentives both from a theoretical
perspective as well as from a practical perspective. First of all we introduce an evolution of trust
in repeated implicit contract relationships. The distributional assumption how trust evolves with
(non)ful￿llment decisions by principals allows for adaptive learning on the side of the agent and
covers quite di⁄erent ex ante evaluations about the trustworthiness of principals. Agents are
assumed to be characterized by bounded rationality, and unforeseeable contingencies prevented
separating equilibria. These two assumptions give rise to rely on trust as part of contracts in
the ￿rst place. As long as agents are able to recall the entire sequence of play, non-alternating
strategies were found to be optimal, i.e. principals build up trust in early periods by ful￿llment
of contracts (if that is ever optimal) and then harvest the bene￿ts from high trust by not ful￿lling
the contract in later periods. If discounting is high, alternating strategies may become optimal.
We further show that higher levels of ex ante trust increase the value of the agency and can at
least partially o⁄set detrimental e⁄ects of a high discount rate. As trust works as a moderator
in this paper￿ s model, we also contribute to the sparse literature in that respect.
In an extension of the model where agents could not recall the entire history of play, we show
that the less periods the agent is able to recall the higher the pressure for the principal to ful￿ll
the implicit contract. Furthermore, we demonstrate optimality of alternating strategies. That
is, principals switch back and forth between ful￿llment and nonful￿llment of the implicit part of
contracts. Here a subset of trigger strategies that is usually exogenous to implicit contract models
can be derived endogenously, thus o⁄ering some justi￿cation for the conventional approach.
These strategies imply an average level of trust in agency that is generally smaller than one,
34According to Rousseau (1990, p. 390), a psychological contract are individual beliefs regarding reciprocal
obligations.
24i.e. is less than maximum possible. As such we formalize the idea of optimal trust suggested
by Wicks et al., 1999. An interesting and important interpretation of the analysis relates to
performance measurement systems and performance appraisals. Although transparency, fairness
and understandability are important to make performance measurement systems work - that is,
employees trust the process or system - attaining or maintaining de￿nite transparency and
understandability is not in every case viable as it may become too costly. At the other end, we
identify a critical trust level that employers optimally do not go below. Therefore, a su¢ ciently
high level of employee trust in the system and the appraisals su¢ ce. We substantiated our
claim that these issues need to be taken into account even if veri￿able accounting numbers are
available.
This paper suggests a model for the formal analysis of a trust relationship between two parties.
An agent trusts a principal with a certain probability. Observability of agent e⁄ort puts the
principal￿ s trust in the agent aside; it is therefore a one-sided trust relationship. Extending it
by including non-observability of agent e⁄ort such that the principal needs to trust the agent to
expend the desired e⁄ort level (in the absence of veri￿able performance measures); a two-sided
trust relationship would result. Another possible extension could be to include control as a
matter of choice by the principal. It seems worthwhile and promising to add more structure
to the model in these respects. Also, these model extensions then lead to empirical predictions
beyond the ones we propose, and experimental research as well as ￿eld research could provide
in-depth tests of these.
25Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) Consider period t with induced trust ￿t￿1. If it is optimal to dishonor the implicit contract
in period t with discount rate r; given ￿t￿1, then it must be also optimal to dishonor it in
period t with r0 > r; given ￿t￿1; as value functions (or equivalently: the left hand side of the
non-reneging constraint (12)) are decreasing in r. Hence, starting with the same initial level of
trust, ￿0, the induced level of trust in period t with discount rate r;￿r
t￿1; must be at least as
high as with r0 > r; i.e. ￿r
t￿1 ￿ ￿r0
t￿1 for all t; for ￿r
t￿1 < ￿r0
t￿1 to be true for some period t there
must have been a period ￿ < t with ￿r
￿￿1 = ￿r0
￿￿1 with nonful￿llment for r but ful￿llment for
r0: a contradiction. Hence, the number of periods in which the implicit contract is honored is
weakly decreasing in r: Let ￿￿ the optimal strategy with r and ￿￿￿ the optimal strategy with
r0 > r. As S (￿) is decreasing in r; S (￿￿￿;r0) < S (￿￿￿;r); and as S (￿￿￿;r) < S (￿￿;r) it follows
that S (￿￿￿;r0) < S (￿￿;r) such that the principal￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ decreases in r:(b) This
part follows from the positive a¢ ne transformation of (13) that results from a higher level of ex
ante trust.￿
Proof of Proposition 3
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where ￿0 denotes the prior level of trust. In the ￿nal period of the agency, strategic principals
will not pay the bonus, i.e. ￿T = 0; because SD
T (￿T￿1) ￿ SH
T (￿T￿1) for any history of play. Since
alternating strategies are ruled out by (16), any strategy that has ￿1 = 0; leads to a surplus
of S(￿1 = 0;￿2 = 0;::;￿T = 0) =
￿0(4￿￿0)
2(2￿￿0)2) < 3
2; which is clearly dominated by S(￿￿) if r is
su¢ ciently low (￿ su¢ ciently close to 1). A strategy ￿￿= (￿1 = 1;￿2 = 1;::;￿￿ = 1;￿￿+1 =





t=2 ￿t￿1 + 3
2￿￿. Hence,







is positive for all ￿ ￿ T ￿ 1 if r is su¢ ciently
low.
(b) If r is su¢ ciently large, only the ￿rst period payo⁄of the surplus function matters. The ￿rst
period payo⁄ is maximized by nonful￿llment, ￿1 = 0:￿
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that r is su¢ ciently low such that the time value of surpluses can be ignored. Consider
a representative sequence ￿R ￿
￿F;1
￿
consisting of ￿F ful￿llments and one nonful￿llment. The








at each ful￿llment the agent recalls ￿F ￿1 nonful￿llments and one ful￿llment and at the period







Now assume a second nonful￿llment being optimal, d = 2. We consider two di⁄erent strategies
in placing the second nonful￿llment. In strategy A it is placed immediately after the ￿rst
nonful￿llment and in strategy B the two nonful￿llments are not placed in a row. The surpluses
related to strategies A and B are given by




























































￿F . As both SD and SH are increasing convex functions of
￿(￿); and as for the marginal surpluses it holds SD0 > SH0 for all ￿(￿); ￿ is strictly positive. Hence,
if a second nonful￿llment is optimal is must be placed immediately after the ￿rst nonful￿llment.
The same argumentation applies if d > 2 nonful￿llments are optimal. Hence, if a repetition
of representative strategies ￿R ￿
￿F;d
￿
is consistent with equilibrium behavior, d nonful￿llments
must be placed in a row such that there is at most one change from nonful￿llment to ful￿llment
within a representative sequence.￿
Proof of Proposition 4
Assume r = 0 for the whole proof.
a) We ￿rst prove that independent of the initial trust ￿0 at the beginning of the ￿rst period it
is always optimal to establish full trust right from the beginning of the relationship. Assume
T > 2￿F. We ￿rst show that strategy ￿(￿F;0) = (￿1 = ￿2 = :: = ￿￿F = 1;0;0;::;0); i.e. ful￿ll
￿F periods and then never again, dominates all strategies ￿(￿F￿i;0) = (￿1 = ￿2 = :: = ￿￿F￿i =








35After the representative sequence has been played once, the surplus is the same for every future repetition
due the agent￿ s limited recall.
36Assuming T > 2￿
F under strategy ￿(￿
F;0) or ￿(￿
F ￿ i;0); respectively, trust is completely destroyed at the






; respectively, such that all future payo⁄s are zero.










where the subscript i indicates the number of fewer ful￿llments under ￿(￿F￿i;0) compared with
￿(￿F;0): Note that (18) contains i strictly positive elements more than (19) due to i additional
ful￿llments and limited recall. The pro￿t di⁄erence ￿ = S(￿(￿F;0)) ￿ S(￿(￿F￿1;0)) using
(18) and (19) amounts to









dE(￿) > 0 and dSD
dE(￿) > 0 for any history of play, the ful￿llment in period ￿F under
S(￿(￿F;0)) provides for
SD(￿t￿1) ￿ SD(￿t￿1
i ) > 0; t = ￿F + 1;::;2￿F: (20)
This proves S(￿(￿F;0)) > S(￿(￿F￿1;0)): By iteration, it can be shown that S(￿(￿F￿i;0)) >
S(￿(￿F￿i ￿ 1;0)); i = 2;::;￿F ￿ 1: Thus, S(￿(￿F;0)) > S(￿(￿F￿i;0)) for all i = 1;::;￿F ￿ 1:
Next, we show that strategy ￿(￿F;￿￿F+1;::;￿T); where the ￿t￿ s; t = ￿F + 1;::;T; are optimally
chosen, dominates all other possible strategies. Assume that strategy ￿(￿F￿i;0) is changed by
replacing a nonful￿llment decision in period t = e t = ￿F ￿ i + 1;::;(2￿F ￿ i) with a ful￿llment
decision. Because d2SH
d[E(￿)]2 > 0 and d2SD
d[E(￿)]2 > 0 ￿which only holds in case of limited recall so
that the sample size or the denominator in the expected level of trust remains constant at ￿F
￿marginal gains (losses) from ful￿llment (nonful￿llment) are increasing in previous ful￿llments
(nonful￿llments). Hence, if a nonful￿llment is replaced by a ful￿llment it has to be in period
e t = ￿F ￿ i + 1: Optimality of that replacement follows from the steps of the proof above
implying S(￿(￿F￿i + 1;0)) > S(￿(￿F￿i;0)): Again, by iteration the optimality of additional
replacements in periods e t = ￿F ￿ i + 2;::;￿F can be shown leading (again) to ￿(￿F;0) ￿
￿(￿F￿i;0) for all i = 1;::;￿F ￿1: Obviously, ￿(￿F;￿￿F+1;::;￿T) ￿ ￿(￿F;0) proving optimality
of ￿(￿F;￿￿F+1;::;￿T):
b) We next prove that for all ￿F; d > 0 is a necessary condition for optimality. Assume a
sequence of ￿F ful￿llment decisions has been played leading to full trust. Now compare the
following sequences
￿d=1 = (￿t = 0;1;1;::;￿t+￿F+1 = 1) (21)
￿d=0 = (￿t = 1;1;1;::;￿t+￿F+1 = 1); (22)
starting in period t: Note that both sequences consist of (￿F + 1)￿ elements to ensure that full
trust is (re)established at the end of the sequences. The crucial step in the proof is that the
28trust level given ￿d=1 remains constant after decision in period t, ￿t = 0, because when moving
on from period (t+i) to (t+i+1);i 2 f1;2;::￿Fg; the agent￿ s limited recall capability "deletes"
the ful￿llment in period (t ￿ ￿F) from memory while "storing" the ful￿llment decision from
period (t+i): As such the single nonful￿llment in period t reduces the trust level from full trust,
E(￿) = 1, under ￿d=1 to E(￿) = ￿F￿1



















Simple algebra shows that S(￿d=1) > S(￿d=0) holds for any ￿F:
c) After the ￿rst representative sequence has been played, induced trust is less than one. Apply-
ing the same arguments as in a) at the optimum the representative sequence must be repeated
as long as possible given there are at least ￿F￿ periods remaining to "harvest" trust after it has





As the results in a), b), and c) are derived for r = 0 they also hold for a su¢ ciently low discount
rate.￿
Proof of Proposition 5
The idea of the proof is to transform the optimal strategy into a pro￿t annuity. [Clearly, the
optimal strategy will have the highest pro￿t annuity.] Optimal strategies are characterized by
their representative sequence. E⁄ects of the ex ante distribution of trust are eliminated after
initial play of ￿F ful￿llments (which have already been proven optimal). Subsequent repetitions
of the representative sequence will then be played with recurring levels of trust solely determined
by ￿F and d: The ￿rst decision and its associated pro￿t which is not in￿ uenced by ex ante trust is
the ￿rst nonful￿llment after ￿F ful￿llments. Therefore we rearrange the representative sequence
such that d nonful￿llments are followed by ￿F ful￿llments. With ￿F and d given, the pro￿t
annuity based on the decision sequence ￿(d;￿F) obtains as
a =
(1 + r)(￿F+d) ￿ r
(1 + r)(￿F+d) ￿ 1
￿ ￿0(r;d;￿F); (23)










denotes the present value
resulting from playing the sequence once. The derivative of (23) with respect to d amounts to
@
@d




(1 + r)(￿F+d) ￿
￿0 ￿ ln(1 + r)
￿




29From (24) it follows
@
@d




(1 + r)(￿F+d) ￿
￿0 ￿ ln(1 + r)
￿




which after rearranging obtains as
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@d













(1+r)(￿F +d)￿1 denotes the annuity factor. (25) says that an additional nonful￿ll-
ment inserted into the representative sequence is e¢ cient if the normalized marginal present
value increases faster in d than the annuity factor decreases in d. When is condition (25) likely
to hold? If ￿F increases, the right-hand side of (25) decreases. At the same time the left-hand





; and with ￿F increasing, the number of possible subsequent nonful￿llments
increases. At the same time, establishing full trust takes more periods. From proposition 4 we
know that establishing full trust is optimal. With ￿F increasing the marginal loss from nonful-
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h




i=1 ￿i + ￿t
￿i3 > 0 (27)
show; (26) and (27) increase in t = ￿F and ￿t which - for expositional brevity - is here assumed
to be continuous. Therefore, d weakly increases in ￿F.￿
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